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Foucault and Habermas [The Cambridge Campanion to Foucault, 2nd Edition]
- David Ingram 10/25/04 Filename: Foucaultnew.wpd

I confess a deep reluctance to commenting on Foucault in light of his astute observation that commentaries only “say
what has already been said and repeat tirelessly what was nevertheless never said."i How much truer this is when the
commentator proposes to repeat an earlier commentary, as I propose to do here.ii
The vanity of my undertaking will hopefully be offset by the modesty of my aim: to revisit the debate
between Foucault and Habermas in order to dispel the notion that they are engaged in incompatible rather than
complementary acts of social critique. Accepted wisdom has it that Foucault is an anti-humanist who rejects the
emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment. Habermas, by contrast, is portrayed as the arch defender of those ideals.
Again, “common knowledge” holds that Foucault is a historical relativist with strong “anarchist” leanings, while
Habermas is a “transcendental” philosopher in the Kantian vein engaged in rationally deducing universal and
necessary norms.
In truth, both are humanists - despite their divergent takes on the philosophical coherence of humanism. Both
readily accede to the value of such things as rights and democratic institutions in shaping and protecting modern
critical aptitudes, and both accept the ambivalent nature of rights and democratic institutions in simultaneously
constraining and enabling individual acts of non-conformism and resistance. Where they principally differ is on their
choice of priorities: Foucault can be understood as a modern-day virtue ethicist fighting to liberate the capacity of
individual self-choice and personal self-formation from oppressive conformism while Habermas can be seen as a
political theorist concerned with justifying and promoting a more just conception of democracy based upon an ethics
of discourse.
To be sure, Foucault and Habermas seem to differ quite strongly on whether philosophical humanism is
necessary for motivating critical practice in some deep “theoretical” sense, and they also seem to disagree on whether
philosophical humanism is even coherent. But here too I shall argue that the difference between them is largely one of
perception. Foucault and Habermas agree that humanism forces us to think of human agency in terms of dualistic
categories of reflection; they just assess this situation differently. Whereas Foucault sees humanism as an ambivalent
force of self-empowerment that excludes as much as it includes and constrains as much as it emancipates, Habermas
sees it as an instantiation of dialogical openness that is unconditionally liberating.
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Before proceeding further it is advisable to acknowledge up front that any discussion of Foucault and
Habermas must confront the messy fact that their own thinking about critical theory underwent fairly drastic changes
over a period of twenty-odd years. Here I am again reminded of Foucault’s own admonition to those who would
aspire to be his critics: "Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same. Leave it to our bureaucrats and
police to see that our papers are in order" (AK, 17). While I'm afraid I cannot grant him this last request, I do so with
the knowledge that none of us who thinks himself or herself a critical theorist - including Foucault - has ever
succeeded in resisting the urge to police the limits of what can and cannot be said. Having conceded that, I will limit
my policing by focusing mainly on his and Habermas’s most mature writings, in which both reclaim the legacy of
Kant and the Enlightenment against each other.iii
After briefly discussing Foucault’s initial reservations about Enlightenment humanism, I will turn to
Habermas’s defense of the same. Following this initial exchange, I propose to examine their respective “theories” of
social and - above all - critical practice. The standard view held by most commentators is that Habermas situates
critical practice in consensus-oriented communicative action unconstrained by power, while Foucault situates critical
practice in strategic action that is importantly conditioned by power. I argue that this view is grossly misleading. What
Habermas means by “communicative action” must incorporate something like “strategic action” in Foucault’s sense of
the term; conversely, what Foucault means by “strategic action” must incorporate something like what Habermas
means by “communicative interaction.” I conclude my commentary by arguing that the two sorts of critical
theory/practice put forward by Habermas and Foucault are complementary rather than antagonistic.

The Critique of Humanism in Marx and Nietzsche

The proper place to begin our discussion is with humanism, since it is around this elusive concept that so
much of the debate between Habermas and Foucault seems to revolve. To that end, a brief reprise of the
quintessentially ambivalent reception of humanism among their philosophical progenitors - especially Marx and
Nietzsche – seems appropriate. Humanism - or the notion that there exists a universal moral core common to
humanity - is the very substance and soul of modern enlightenment.iv Against all parochial narrow-mindedness and
tyranny, it celebrates the inherent freedom and equality of all persons, and charts an unwavering course toward
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complete and total emancipation. Since Rousseau, critical theorists have continued to sing its praises. But not without
reservation. Although Rousseau extolled the higher freedom that comes with obeying the universal law of reason, he
rued the calculated egoism unleashed by the rational dissolution of social bonds. Hegel (like Burke) later pilloried
Rousseau’s own defense of sentimental individualism in his withering critique of the “Rights of Man and of Citizen,”
whose abstraction from social convention he thought paved the way for the terrorist excesses of the French
Revolution. Then there is Marx. Even while opposing Feuerbachian humanism to capitalism, the young Marx
rejected human rights (political emancipation) as symptomatic of this very same dehumanization. True emancipation,
he reasoned, will only come with the revolutionary establishment of communism, which abolishes private property.
This having been accomplished, conflicts between egoistic individuals will gradually disappear - along with rights that
are needed to protect them from each other.
Within barely a few years of penning his critique of human rights, Marx would come to rephrase the
emancipatory aims of humanism in a way that would cast doubt on humanism itself. Leaving aside his premature
speculations about the world-historical mission of the proletariat as a truly universal class encompassing the
oppression of all other classes, what remains in his later thought is the utter rejection of idealism in any form and the
complete embrace of historical relativism. For the mature Marx, humanity is an unreal abstraction that masks real
conflicts between economic classes that have essentially antagonistic interests and share nothing of importance in
common. That is why Marx eschews utopian socialist appeals to human decency in galvanizing revolutionary action.
Sounding more and more like Bentham, he never ceases to remind us how useless such vapid notions as human rights
are in adjudicating conflicts over property and other matters of distributive justice. And buying into moral abstractions
can be risky for other reasons as well, not the least being that they can be interpreted in ways that are entirely
compatible with the status quo. As Marx pointed out, because human rights are by nature abstract, the justice and
equality they serve to protect is likewise abstract, permitting extreme inequalities in their actual exercise.
Admittedly, my all-to-brief summary of Marx’s anti-humanism fails to do justice to his irrepressible faith in
the inevitability of progress, understood precisely in terms of universal human fulfillment. It is therefore hardly
surprising that it is Nietzsche, not Marx, who is today regarded as the real founder of modern anti-humanism.
Sounding like an apostate of Feuerbach and the young Marx, Nietzsche sees in humanism nothing more than a secular
version of theism, with all its freedom- and life-denying implications. Even that great paean to freedom and life -
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human rights - is for him nothing but a sly invention on the part of the weak to constrain the vital, creative powers of
the strong. As Nietzsche so eloquently put it in the Genealogy of Morals: “What an enormous price man had to pay for
reason, seriousness, and control over his emotions - those grand human prerogatives and cultural showpieces! How
much blood and horror lies behind all good things!”v
Thanks to Freud and the Frankfurt School, subsequent generations of critical theorists would make
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the modern soul - that “wild beast hurling itself against the bars of its cage”vi - the centerpiece
of their own critique of “rationalized society,” as Weber understood it. It is thus not without reason that Adorno and
Horkheimer would later cite the recurring motifs of Nietzsche’s genealogy - the relationship between exchange and
justice as equivalence-retribution-revenge and the erection of rational autonomy on the ruins of a guilty and repressed
“conscience” - in building their case against enlightenment.vii
But we really owe it to Foucault - who admittedly took his lead from Nietzsche and not from the Frankfurt
School viii- for having so adroitly exposed the ambivalent effects of this humanistic discourse.
According to him, humanism promises emancipation at the cost of imposing uniformity and
excluding those who don’t fit the mold of a genuine human being. Its universal scope, which at first
seems so progressive in marking for emancipation women, persons of non-European descent, and the
working poor who formerly had been denied their humanity, actually works by subjecting all persons
to the hegemonic regimen and discipline of a single, universal code of behavior. Here, reason conceived as the faculty of universal moral commandments - supposedly dictates clear and precise
norms that are susceptible of being administered to a subjugated population in a scientifically
rigorous manner by an elite body of technocrats. Corresponding to this regime of kno wledge and
power we find a parallel universe of self-discovery and self-control instituted within each individual,
which insures that one's innermost identity as a desiring subject, truly revealed and confessed, will
happily synchronize with the innermost identities of other similarly self-constituted subjects. In this
way a generalized will to power, thoroughly decentralized, disseminated, internalized and
individualized in countless contexts by means of diverse micro-technologies, succeeds in generating
that anodyne feeling of freedom and solidarity that earlier social contractarians like Rousseau would
have imagined possible only through more coercive, juridical means.
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Foucault’s Critique of Humanism

It is precisely at this juncture where Foucault’s difference from Habermas seems most glaring.
Habermas, after all, regards his own discourse ethics as the proper heir to Rousseauian social
contractarianism. He thus fancies himself an arch defender of human rights and democracy. But
Foucault clearly doesn’t. And the reasons – all having to do with the frailties of humanism – recall
the sordid uses to which these ideals have been put.
First, there are the empirical arguments against humanism. Like Marx, Foucault regards
humanism as a contingent phase in Western history that is on the verge of surpassing itself, along
with the notion of the sovereign state as the centralized locus of legitimate power. Before there was
humanism there was absolutism, which was embedded within an entirely different economy and an
entirely different paradigm of knowledge and po wer. After humanism, there will be the “death of
Man,” or rather the dissolution of “the subject” into preconditioned habits and reactive responses, in
which concepts like “reason,” “consciousness,” and “rights” as humanism understands them will
cease to exist.
Now, Foucault’s famous treatment of this shift in Discipline and Punish (1975) draws
heavily from his archaeological study of knowledge paradigms (epistemes) developed in The Order
of Things (1966). Until the mid-seventeenth century, knowledge and truth were conceived
analogically; knowing something involved tracing its metaphorical and metonymical relationships to
other things. According to this model, the sovereign ruler was virtually identified with his kingdom,
and his po wer was in some sense viewed in terms that were analogous to God’s power over his
Kingdom, which is to say that it was absolute, unlimited, and in need of no other legitimation. Any
law-breaking was thus regarded as a kind of personal affront, literally a violation of the sovereign's
own bodily integrity. Punishment - which often took the form of public torture and disfigurement therefore served as a ritual, symbolic restoration and re-integration of the monarch's po wer at the
expense of the victim’s dismemberment (DP, 49-56). Furthermore, since merely being suspected of
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criminal activity by the monarch was considered to be an affront to his person (which was presumed
to be relatively infallible in its judgment), a suspect was presumed to be at least partly guilty. Hence,
torturing the suspect served to expiate his guilt as well as reveal the full truth of his criminal intent.
Failure to extract a confession did not invalidate the sovereign’s original suspicion, but it did
exonerate the suspect from any further suspicion of criminality.
The important thing to notice here is that it is personal power, divinely and absolutely
sanctioned, that determines what is right and true - not humanity, which impersonally lends equal
dignity to each and every individual. The rise of humanism changes all that. With the advent of the
classical paradigm of knowledge that emerged in the mid-seventeenth century, we notice a new
egalitarian spirit. Common sense enables each and every one to represent clearly and distinctly the
things of nature according to their proper classifications. Applied to the political sphere, common
sense speaks through the impartial voice of reason - the unique and supreme expression of our
humanity - and perceives the clear limits of arbitrary power in the natural rights of ‘Man.’
Henceforth sovereign power will be limited and divided into separate powers, and it will be exercised
through the people, whose interests and powers it represents. In the age of classical humanism,
punishment ceases to be personal vengeance and is instead rethought contractually, as the repayment
of a debt that is owed to humanity at large. But respecting the dignity and autonomy of the criminal
as one who is rationally accountable for his crime requires extracting this debt in a way that does not
do violence to his rational, moral nature. Imprisonment, based upon a precise calculus of social harm
and responsibility, thus replaced torture at the end of the classical period. If anything remained of the
public spectacle, it was the labor-gangs who 'represented' the moral fault of their criminal idleness
in their hard work and passive confinement.
The theme of labor anticipates the refiguration of sovereign power and punishment according
to yet another - more modern - humanism. The emergence of capitalism had already rendered the
premodern dismemberment and destruction of the body costly. The laboring power of the criminal’s
body was something to be preserved, strengthened and disciplined. The classical, retributive model
of punishment - based upon the contractarian idea of repaying past debts - did not yet capture the
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utilitarian need to rehabilitate the criminal as a future, productive member of society. Beginning in
the nineteenth century, we thus see punishment serving newer and different ends. No longer is one
punished according to what one did (a discrete and quantifiable act capable of definite
representation) but according to what one might do, based upon a psychiatric examination of one's
infinitely malleable and reformable character. In short, punishment increasingly has as its aim the
disciplining of the body as a source of productivity; and discipline, as a softer and less visible - albeit
more global - form of punishment, has as its aim the training of a pliant, productive population (DP.
24). ix
The new humanism sees knowledge and truth as produced, rather than represented, by
humanity. Since Kant, German idealists had insisted that humanity transcendentally produces the
unified world in which it inhabits through its own knowing activity. In the writings of Fichte and
Hegel, humanity is elevated to Promethean dimensions, as the demiurge that continually recreates
itself and its world in striving to realize its nature as absolutely free and unlimited. The 'truth' of the
new human sciences of psychology and sociology would henceforth consist in furthering this
apprenticeship in the art of ‘becoming fully human.’ This infinite task of reform is throughout guided
by an ideal norm of perfection, in comparison to which each and every actual human being is judged
to be deficient if not deviant.
The old humanism sought to represent human nature as it is: essentially limited by the laws
of God and nature. This deference to God and nature designates its own limitations as humanism:
freedom is simultaneously a gift and a necessity imposed upon us whether we like it or not; it is not
something that we give to ourselves. Old humanism’s defense of freedom is thus inherently
conservative: to preserve and protect the natural freedom of the individual against the power of the
state. The new humanism does away with this opposition. Far from suppressing freedom,
governmental po wer rather seeks to cultivate and tame it for productive ends. Freedom - or universal
human fulfilment - becomes the new goal of social progress, whose revolutionary embodiment is the
“pastoral” state.
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As depicted in Foucault’s writings, the reality of this state is quite the opposite of what it
seems. If humanity is something made, it is not made with rational foresight and consciousness. The
same applies to the state: it too is the product of many fortuitous events, not all of them reconcilable.
Classical humanism vested the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state in its representation of a
pre-existing unity: the general and harmonious will of a united people. Modern humanism sees things
differently: the state produces this will out of itself. But the truth of the matter is that there is no
supreme will, people, subject, or humanity that is guiding this process; and so there is no common
humanity being produced. What remains, at the core, are mainly decentralized processes of
conditioning and resistance: action and reaction, biopower. From the highest echelons of impersonal
bureaucratic administration down to the lowest levels of personal self-management, power and
agency remain divided and dispersed. The illusion that someone is in control is no doubt aided and
abetted by all the micro-techniques of macro- and micro-management that the human sciences
proliferate - statistics, archives, metrics, classification schemes, exams, therapies, and disciplines for use in detaining, surveying, conditioning, partitioning and “governing” discrete and irreducibly
diverse populations. But these processes feed off of - and in turn incite - the very reactions they seek
to control. So there is no sovereign po wer and no common humanity striving to embody it; only
context-specific relations of force and counter-force that well up inside us in the form of conditioned
responses and partially controlled and calculated reactions.
There is, then, no reality to which “Humanity” refers. From a truly enlightened and
“scientific” point of view, it would be altogether more accurate to say that there are no
self-determining subjects strictu sensu, only social force fields traversed by the material effects of
labor, language, and desire. But Foucault finds humanism logically incoherent in ways that are
potentially terrifying, as well. The classical paradigm conceived humanism in terms of a dualistic
ontology. Universal humanity here designates an unconditioned immaterial “substance” - reason, or
“soul” - which stands opposed to the particular embodied person, with all its determining passions
and limitations. Corresponding to this ontological dualism we find an epistemological one: the
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knowing subject - which is again conceived as the rational subject - stands opposed to an independent
object, which it seeks to represent.
Dualism proves to be the downfall of this paradigm. Simply put, it is impossible to
understand how an object can be represented to a subject that is separated from it by such an immense
gulf. The problem is magnified further when that object happens to be humanity itself, which - as
Kant would later argue - cannot even be thought as an object in the strict sense of the term. Hence
Kant’s attempt to embed humanity in a more modern - and if you will, more humanistic - paradigm
of knowledge. The epistemological dualism between subject and object is overcome once the human
subject - or more precisely, a universal transcendental subject - is postulated as constituting
objectivity by applying its own universal categories of reasoning to passive sensation. The rest is
history. Kant’s epigones in the German Idealist tradition successively eliminate the “pre-critical”
residues of Kant’s humanism -specifically his postulation of a “thing-in-itself” that stands in for the
unknowable causal source of sensation - thereby rendering humanity epistemologically and
ontologically absolute.
But there remains something odd about this solution. Humanity is postulated as both the
totality of reality and knowledge and its original creative source. “Man” is the term we use to
designate each and every finite concrete individual as well as the term we use to designate the
universal Spirit that both inhabits and transcends the individual. This “transcendental-empirical
doublet,” as Foucault refers to it (OT, 318). has not really expunged the dualism of subject and
object, universal and particular. It has only declared the two sides of the equation to be
commensurable because one side cannot be thought without the other. Transferred to a discussion of
rights, the identification of humanity or universal reason, conceived as the unconditioned legislator,
and the individual embodied person, understood as the legal subject, appears patently paradoxical.
How (to rephrase Rousseau’s query) can one be obligated to oneself? How can the effect (end) be
identical to the origin (cause)? In short, ho w can one be God?
Dialectical paradoxes like these pose a real danger. Who, after all, is humanity and, more
importantly, who in particular speaks for it? Locke, Rousseau, and Kant - the founders of the modern
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idea of human rights - defined humanity to suit themselves, and by so doing consigned women, wage
laborers, and persons of non-European descent to the status of partial humans. But the danger here of
confusing a general attribute with any one of its particular instances is unavoidable, since humanity
and the rights that properly accrue to it will remain empty and meaningless - without definition unless they are spoken for by someone. Conversely, once spoken for and declared, the rights of
“Man” - no matter how parochially interpreted to suit the needs of just certain “men” - will take on
the dubious ideological status of a timeless and universal

truth. Henceforth, women and people of

non-European descent will have their humanity measured by the extent to which they have
“disciplined” themselves to become like men of European descent. The only proper antidote to this
oppressive mystification is to deconstruct the idea of humanity by deploying the same
“philosophical-historical” practice as that engaged in by Nietzsche, Marx, and the early members of
the Frankfurt School. In the words of Foucault:

. . . the question is being raised: “what, therefore, am I,” I who belong to this
humanity, perhaps to this piece of it, at this point in time, at this instant of humanity
which is subjected to the power of truth in general and truths in particular? The first
characteristic of this philosophical-historical practice, if you will, is to desubjectify
the philosophical question by way of historical contents, to liberate historical
contents by examining the effects of power whose truth affects them and from which
they supposedly derive. x

The deconstruction of humanism suggested here announces a form of critique and
enlightenment that seems far removed from if not opposed to the concept of critique and
enlightenment advocated by Habermas. Speaking of Habermas, Foucault says that the aim of critique
should not be to “identify general principles of reality” - such as humanity or some other
transcendental, universal ground - from which “what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or
illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive” can be known (WC, 200-01). Its aim should
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rather be the genealogical tracing of the “conditions for the appearance of a singularity born of
multiple determining elements of which it is not the product but the effect” (WC, 203). In other
words, genuine critique should be less concerned about its own truth or untruth and more concerned
about clarifying - in some imperfect and unavoidably partial way - the peculiar historical conditions
in which it operates.

Habermas’s Response to Foucault

But can we criticize and resist these peculiar historical conditions without the aid of
humanism and its sacred rights? There was a time when Foucault thought so: "if one wants to look for
a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary powers,
it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of
a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from
the principle of sovereignty" (PK, 108).
Habermas’s response to Foucault can be understood as an attempt to fulfill at least part of
this aspiration. Although he doubts whether any anti-disciplinarian right can be formulated that
doesn’t appeal to human rights, he does think that humanism and its sacred rights can be “liberated
from the principle of sovereignty” (or, as Habermas puts it, the principle of “subject-centered
reason”). In other words, Habermas thinks that Enlightenment humanism can be interpreted in ways
that avoid the philosophical paradoxes adduced by Foucault. Furthermore, Habermas thinks his
explanation sho ws not only why humanism is still alive and kicking - as a factual force within
post-subject-centered society - but also why it designates a relatively permanent disposition toward
emancipation within all human society.
As for the “normalizing” features of disciplinary society that both he and Foucault criticize,
Habermas locates their cause not in philosophical humanism, but in certain “social pathologies”
associated with class societies and, more specifically, of late capitalism. xi Like Foucault, Habermas
deplores the extent to which dividing practices and hierarchies of kno wledge undermine persons’
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critical aptitudes. The intensive division of intellectual and manual labor and the splitting-off of
specialized forms of technical expertise, he notes, all too easily lend themselves to centralized,
top-do wn management, routinization and normalization, conformity, and rigid discipline. He shares
Foucault's conviction that governmental paternalism in dispensing social welfare robs citizens of
their freedom, dignity, and individuality. But that is precisely the point. Were it not for the vitality
of humanism, would persons even complain of their dehumanization? Would parents and teachers
resist the bureaucratization of schools? Would social workers and clients, nurses, doctors, and
patients, resist the bureaucratization of their health and welfare (PDM, 287)? And what about
Foucault ’s defense of the rights of prisoners, homosexuals, and mental patients (PDM, 290)? Last but not
least, could the author of “Confronting Governments: Human Rights” (1984) have written these words
sincerely if he had not been a humanist?

There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its duties, and that obliges
one to speak out against every abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever its victims.
After all, we are all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to
show solidarity. xii

Habermas suspects that Foucault’s yearning for “new rights” is really nothing more than a
yearning for a less problematic philosophical paradigm in which to formulate the old human rights. In any
case, the “crypto-normativity” of Foucault’s rhetorically charged genealogies (as Nancy Fraser puts it)
shows that Foucault is not the “happy positivist” he claimed to be. xiii I f i t t u r n s o u t t h a t F o u c a u l t i s
a kind of humanist after all, we shall have to turn to Habermas in order to understand why.
Let’s begin with Habermas’s attempt to reinterpret modern humanism in a way that
ma kes no refere nce to that so vereign super -subject, huma nity. T he reader will recall tha t
this notion implies both an epistemological and an ontological dualism that is as
dangerous as it is incoherent. This dualism can be formulated in many ways. On one hand,
it denotes a subject that kno ws an object only b y superimposing its o wn unitar y ide ntity
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on it. Ontologically, it denotes a transcendent - universal and unconditioned - ground of
agency that conditions the activity of individual embodied subjects. This super-sensible
ground - characteristically identified with Reason - develops and progressively realizes
its essential freedom in the course of history. In all these instances, humanity appears
as a contradictory identity of opposites. More importantly, from Rousseau on, this
philosophical (or conceptual) dialectic is thought to underlie a real practical one: the
so-called “Dialectic of Enlightenment.” According to this dialectic, humanism is
inherently ambivalent. Historical progress in enlightenment and emancipation
simultaneously appears as historical regression to mythic fatalism. Modernists like Marx
and Nietzsche respond to this dialectic by projecting a good outcome in the end
(“communism,” the “end of man,” etc.); anti-modernists like Heidegger do so by
nostalgically recovering (if only in “poetic thinking”) a prelapsarian origin unsullied by
metaphysical “Man.”
No w, Haber ma s proposes to dissolve this dialectic b y re -fo unding the idio m of
human rights on a new philosophical paradigm: communication. Prior to the linguistic
turn - and more precisely, prior to the pragmatist linguistic turn inaugurated by the late
Wittgenstein - philosophers were mainly obsessed with the problem of knowledge, which
they characteristically interpreted in Cartesian terms. This problem begins with a lone
subject who see ks certainty re garding objects in the world o utside of its immediate
stream of consciousness. Subjective partiality is avoided and objective certainty
achieved by recourse to innate reason, or common sense. But it is precisely here where
all the problems of classical and modern humanism begin. A better place to begin,
Habermas believes, is with social interaction - or intersubjectivity. This is because
social interaction is the foundation for both subjectivity and knowledge. Without
socializa tion there wo uld be no individua tio n a nd no subjects. And witho ut people
raising c laims abo ut the world that ca n be chec ked b y others, ther e wo uld be no
knowledge, no “impartial” belief.
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Speech action (or what Habermas calls “communicative action”) is thus the
primar y medium in wh ich subjectivity a nd kno wled ge e mer ge. Unlike kno wing subjects,
speakers do not relate to one another in the mode of

“spectators” observing one another

as “objects.” Rather, they relate to one another in the mode of “participants” engaged
in a process of mutual engagement and understanding. Here, what is mutually
communicated, shared, and agreed upon - intersubjectivety - takes precedence over
subjectivity. This means that there are no subjects, understood as absolutely autonomous
and self-determining centers of activity - and no humanity, conceived as the universal,
sovereign ground of that activity.

If we abandon the conceptual framework of the
philosophy of the subject, sovereignty need not be concentrated in the
people in a concretistic manner . . . . The “self” of the self-organizing legal
community disappears in the subjectless forms of communication that
regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation whose fallible
results enjoy the presumption of rationality. This is not to repudiate the
intuition associated with the idea of popular sovereignty but rather to
re-interpret it in intersubjective terms.

xiv

Decentering “humanity” in this way does not mean that all forms of ontological and
epistemological dualism associated with that concept have been dissolved. The dualism
betwe en truth a nd falsehood, right a nd wrong is still preser ved, along with the dualis m
betwe en impartial a nd partial, rational a nd irrational, perspec tive s. Reta ining the se
dualisms is important for Habermas, because social criticism is impossible without them.
And this, precisely, is the benefit of humanism - the establishment of a common,
impartial reference point from which “we” can assert something like “human rights.” But
the meaning of humanism and its duality changes once it is translated into the register
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of communicative action. The dualism bet ween “impartial reason” and “partial belief,”
for instance, no longer designates a metaphysical dualism internal to the individual
subject, but rather a n empirical distinction - and a relative one at that - betwe en t wo
types of intersubjective communication: inclusive, egalitarian, and unconstrained on
one side, and closed, hierarchical, and constrained, on the other.
Now we are in a better position to understand how a communicative paradigm
might avoid the paradoxes of humanism associated with a subject-centered paradigm.

The transcendental-empirical doubling of the relation to self is only
unavoidable so long as there is no alternative to this observer-perspective;
only then does the subject have to view itself as the dominating counterpart
to the wor ld as a whole or as an entity appearing within it. No media tion is
possible between the transcendental I and the intramundane stance of the
empirical I. As soon as linguistically generated intersubjectivity gains
primacy, this alternative no longer applies. Then ego stands within an
interpersonal relationship that allows him to relate to himself as a
participant in an interaction from the perspective of alter. And indeed this
reflection undertaken from the perspective of the participant escapes the
kind of objectification inevitable from the reflexively applied perspective
of the observer (PDM, 297)

Subject-centered humanism encourages each of us to divide ourselves into opposed parts:
one transcendental (universal humanity) the other empirical (“me”). “I” become a “free”
human only to the extent that I direct my higher rational subjectivity against my lower,
embodied subjectivity, and reflect upon this latter syndrome of bodily desires and
conditioned habits as a natural object that can be rationally controlled and, if need be,
dominated and repressed. Communication-centered humanism, by contrast, postulates
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no such division. Under it’s guidance I become a free human by participating in open,
inclusive, and unconstrained discussion regarding the compatibility of my needs with
respect to others. Critical reflection is “from the angle of vision of the second person,”
and this person is not a super-human observer, evaluator, and executor, but just another
partial participant.
The advantage of this paradigm becomes readily apparent when we recall our
earlier discussion of dehumanization and human rights. Habermas, like Foucault, sees
dehumanization as an over-extension of subject-centered (or instrumental) reason.
Unlike Foucault, however, he also sees this over-extension as a “distortion” of
communicative reason, and a distortion moreover, that is not caused by something as
abstract as Enlightenment humanism, but by something as concrete as capitalist
economic growth and its side effects, which call for ever-growing bureaucratic
regulation of everyday life.

Horkheimer and Adorno have, like Foucault, described this process of a
self-overburdening and a self-reifying subjectivity as a world-historical
process. But both sides missed its deeper irony, which consists in the fact
that the communicative potential of reason first had to be released in the
patterns of modern life worlds be fore the unfettered imperatives o f the
economic and administrative subsystems could react back on the vulnerable
practice of everyday life and could thereby promote the cognitive
instrumental dimension to domination over the suppressed moments of
practical reason. The communicative potential of reason has been
simultaneously developed and distorted in the course of capitalist
modernization (PDM, 315).
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As for human rights, subject-centered humanism encourages us to discover them by
simply tapping into our higher rational humanity. Each of us does this in isolation from
others, by simply gazing inward. Our innate conscience is all we need rely on in kno wing
what is right. Unfortunately, our “reason” is all too often clouded by personal bias.
Eliminating bias by striving for ever higher levels of abstraction on which all our reasons
converge leaves us with nothing more than empty platitudes. We may disagree about the
rightness of abortion but who can dispute the notion that every human should have a right
to life with human dignity? Communication-centered humanism, by contrast, mitigates
bias without sacrificing prescriptive specificity by encouraging us to reason together. In
this way, the meaning of human rights is not absolutely fixed for all times and places,
but is subject to concrete historical and contextual interpretation.
How far does this response go toward answering Foucault’s objections to
humanism? Perhaps not far enough. Some critics argue that Habermas’s theory of
communicative action has not entirely escaped the clutches of subject-centered
p h i l o s o p h y . xv A f t e r a l l , h a s n ’ t H a b e r m a s h i m s e l f s a i d t h a t i n c l u s i v e n e s s , r e c i p r o c i t y , a n d
freedom from constraint are necessary, universal norms of rational argumentation
(discourse), so that arguers who refuse to acknowledge them are, in effect, committing
a “performative contradiction”? And doesn’t saying this amount to postulating a kind
of transcendental subjectivity, if only as the theoretical culmination of a logic of moral
development that should - but need not - be historically actualized?
Perhaps not quite, if we are to take Habermas’s word for it. Habermas insists that
“communication is neither a unitary process of self-generation [whether of the spirit or
of the species]” nor an alien fate to which we must submit. Although he himself
subscribes to Kohlberg’s hypothesis regarding logical stages of moral development
(suitably translated into stages of moral communication), he reminds us that actual
progress from stage to stage is contingent on external circumstances. Furthermore, he
recognizes that “even basic concepts that are starkly universalist have a temporal core”
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(PDM, 301). The freedom and equality enjoyed by the eighteenth-century shopkeeper are
not the same as that vouchsafed to present-day clients of the modern welfare state.
This is one reason why Habermas, unlike his colleague Karl-Otto Apel, resists the
temptation to claim anything like a strong transcendental justification for norms of
communicative rationality. Pure philosophical reflection and conceptual analysis alone
cannot confirm the empirical existence and efficacy of these norms apart from social
science. It may well be that we know of no other way to interpret the notion of rational
persuasion except by appeal to these norms; but that is at least partly a matter of
disputable fact, not of intuitive certainty. In any case, the actual meaning and force of
co mmunicatio n nor ms is alwa ys partly and p erhaps lar gely co nte xtualiz ed with re spect
to actual -spatially and temporally delimited - processes of communication.

This

applies to the justification of human rights, as well. As Habermas points out, even if one
might plausibly argue that some human rights - such as freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and freedom of conscience - were instrumentally justifiable as necessary
conditio ns for co mmunicative ratio nality, this wo uld not apply to all human rights. And
even if it did, the “realization of human rights” - their precise definition as enforceable,
legal rights - would vary depending upon the local speech contexts in which they were
r e c e i v e d . xvi
Hence Habermas today is much more sensitive to the notion that “we” who interpret
rights designates a plural and multicultural nexus of many different identities whose
being is never theoretically or ideally pre-given but is always in the process of changing
in the course of historical political struggle:

Ethical discourses aimed at achieving a collective self-understanding
- discourses in which participants attempt to clarify how they understand
themselves as members of a particular nation, as members of a
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community or state, as inhabitants of a region, etc. which traditions they
wish to cultivate, how they should treat each other as minorities, and
marginal groups. . . constitute an important part of politics. B ut under
conditions of cultural and social pluralism . . .there often lie interests and
value orientations that are by no means constitutive of the identity of the
political community as a whole. . .(TNMD, 156).

Foucault’s Later Humanism

T oward the end o f his life Fouca ult wr yly ob served that he wa s “in a little more
agreement” with Habermas than Habermas was with him. This agreement is strongly
reflected in Foucault’s later embrace of certain humanistic ideals of the Enlightenment,
including the notion that there may well exist trans-historical or “permanent”
dispositions among all humans to resist government, broadly conceived. On this reading,
universal norms of communication such as unconstrained consensus and rights to
question are cr ucial id eals to defend. We wo uld there fore be well advised to see ho w
Foucault rephrased the convergence of his later theory with Habermas’s, while at the
same time keeping in mind his belief that he and Habermas were embarking on very
d i f f e r e n t c r i t i c a l p r o j e c t s . xvii
The extent to which Foucault’s critical project converges with and diverges from Habermas’s can be
gleaned from his monumental history of sexuality. The last two volumes of the History of Sexuality published during
his life marked something of a watershed in Foucault's understanding of his life's work. He now admitted that his
central preoccupation with humanism (or as he now put it, the “relationship between the subject and truth”) could
best be approached by way of a genealogy of ethical self-understanding. What now occupies center stage in his
analysis is the way in which persons voluntarily and intentionally subject themselves to technologies of self-control
- technologies that are embedded in specific practices and types of knowledge determinant of a way of life, a manner
of self-understanding, an identity - in short, an ethos (UP, 10).
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These practices exhibit their own continuity through time. In contrast to Foucault's earlier emphasis on
epistemological breaks, his genealogical account of the Christian ethos that has shaped the modern age
acknowledges superficial resemblances between its moral codes and those of its Greek and Greco-Roman
predecessors. If we think of the moral code as "the set of values and rules of action that are recommended to the
individual through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies," then all three systems are alike in their
prescription of sexual abstinence (UP, 2 5). Despite his concession that there were universal constants at play
traversing the three ethical schemes, Foucault maintained that there were perhaps deeper rifts embedded in their
"ethical substance." In other words, "the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as
the prime material of his moral conduct," might differ historically, despite the superficial commonality in the way in
which sexuality is talked about. (UP, 26). Some ethical regimes place greater emphasis on the moral code, its
systematicity and inclusiveness. Here adherence to law is decisive in determining the mode of subjection. Others
place emphasis on the esthetics of self-transformation. The Christian ethos and especially its modern, secular
equivalent tend toward the former; the Greek and Greco-Roman ethic, toward the latter (UP, 21, 31). The difference
between the three becomes apparent when examining the ethics of sexual abstinence. Whereas the Greek ethos
sought to cultivate a moderate use of pleasure for the sake of personal and civic virtue, and the Greco-Roman ethos
sought to cultivate a solicitous care over the self for the sake of rationally administering a complex identity, the
Christian ethos seeks to cultivate a hermeneutics of desire aimed at discovering the hidden truth of the soul. Its
renunciation of a fallen self that is permanently deceived about itself marks the transition to a deontological ethic that
privileges dutiful obligation to moral law over esthetic self-realization.
Now it is well known that Foucault identified his own critical project in terms of the kind of virtue ethic
exemplified in these pre-modern ethical orientations. As he put it, “There is something in critique which is akin to
virtue . . . . [the] critical attitude as virtue in general” (WC, 192). Indeed, this is one the features that seems to
distinguish his critical project from Habermas’s, which is so concerned with legitimating human rights.. However, it
would be wrong to liken this retrieval of an earlier ethical orientation as a “conservative” rejection of modern ethics,
as Habermas once thought (MP, 354).xviii F o u c a u l t d i s d a i n e d t h e i d e a o f r e t u r n i n g t o t h e p a s t . M o r e
importantly, as we shall now see, Foucault later situated his project within the same
modern moral framework shared by Kant and Habermas. What results from this
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amalgamation of the ancients and the moderns is a distinctively

“postmodern” virtue

ethic that privileges the radical freedom to resist normalization as such.
Foucault tells us, in fact, that the critical attitude we typically associate with the
modern Enlightenment arises “in any moment of history” in which governmentality, or
the relatio nship between “po wer, tr uth, and the subject” is que stio ned (WC, 199).
Foucault’s

invocation of a “critical spirit” running throughout human history sounds

very humanistic, and is confirmed by his view about human thought itself:

Thought . . . can and must be analyzed in every manner of speaking,
doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as subject of
learning, as ethical and juridical subject, as subject conscious of himself
a n d o t h e r . I n t h i s s e n s e . t h o u g h t i s u n d e r s t o o d a s the very fo rm of a ction - a s
a ction in so fa r a s it imp lies th e p lay o f true a nd false, th e accepta nce o r refu sa l o f
ru les, the relation o f on eself to o th ers.... Posing the question in this way brings into play
certain altogether g eneral princip les. Singular forms of experience may perfectly well harbor
un iversa l stru ctu res; they may well not be independent from the concrete determinations of
social existence ... [t]his thought has a historicity which is proper to it. That it should have this
historicity does not mean that it is deprived of all universa l fo rm, but instead the putting into play
of these universal forms is itself historical (FR, 335 - my stress).

W hat ar e these univer sal str uctures o f human tho ught and actio n? Fo ucault gave d iffer ent
answer s to this q uestio n d uring his lifetime. Ho wever, o n occasio n he appealed to no ne o ther than
Hab er mas himself - specifically Haber mas’s theor y o f kno wled ge co nstitutive inter ests - in
ar guing that human natur e is mo tivated b y three q uasi-transcendental or ientatio ns, to war d: (a)
technical o r instr umental co ntro l o f natur e, (b) p ractical co mmunicatio n aimed at mutual
und er standing, and (c) r esistence to do minatio n. Accord ing to Fo ucault:
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po wer relatio ns, r elatio nship s o f co mmu nicatio n, objective capacities should no t
therefore b e co nfused. This is not to say that there is a q uestio n o f thr ee separ ate
do mains. Nor that there is o n o ne hand the field of things, o f per fected techniq ue,
wo r k, and the transfor matio n o f the real; o n the o ther that o f signs, co mmu n icatio n,
r ecipr ocity, and pro d uctio n o f meaning; finally that o f the do minatio n o f the means
o f co nstr aint, o f ineq uality and the actio n o f men upo n men. I t is a q uestio n o f three
typ es o f relatio nship s which in fact always over lap o ne another , suppo rt o ne
ano ther r ecipro cally, and use each o ther mutually as means to an end (S P, 217 -18) .

Significantly, as we saw abo ve, Fo ucault elsewh ere add s a fo ur th “transcendental” str ucture to
this co nstellatio n o f “techniq ues”: “technolo gies o f the self.” xix T he q uestio n we must ask is: W hy
d id Fo ucault feel co mp elled to supp lement Habermas in this way?
To answer this q uestio n, we must loo k mo re clo sely at what Fo ucault fo und pr oblematic in
Hab er mas’s theor y .

Fo ucault is esp ecially inter ested in what Hab ermas has to say abo ut

co mmunicative actio n and d o minatio n (p o wer) . Fo ucault seems to accept Haber mas's gener al
char acter izatio n o f co nsensual co mmunicatio n as fo undatio nal fo r the raising o f valid ity claims
and the incurr ing o f gener al obligatio ns in a mod er n so ciety. T his imp ressio n is r einfor ced b y his
r emar k that

in the ser io us p lay o f q uestio ns and answer s, in the wo r k o f reciprocal elucidatio n,
the rights o f each p er son are in so me sense immanent in the discussion.... The
p er so n asking the q uestions is merely exer cising the r ight that has b een given him:
to r emain unco nvinced, to p er ceive a co ntr adictio n, to req uire infor matio n, to
emp hasize different po stulates, to p oint o ut faulty r easo ning (FR, 38 1).

Elsewher e Fo ucault takes issue with Hab er mas's id ealizatio n o f co nsensual co mmu nicatio n,
d enying that "there co uld b e a state o f co mmunicatio n which wo uld be such that the games o f tr uth
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co uld cir culate fr eely, witho ut o bstacles, witho ut co nstraint and witho ut coercive effects." Stated
b luntly, Fo ucault thinks that Haber mas's assessment o f the pr escr ip tive value to b e acco rded
unco nstr ained co nsensus is too utopian.

I t is b eing b lind to the fact that relatio ns o f po wer ar e no t so mething b ad in
themselves, fro m which o ne must free o ne's self. I don't believe there can be a society
without relations of power, if you understand them as means by which individuals try to conduct, to
determine the behavior of others. The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a
perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of
management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these games of
power to be played with a minimum of domination.xx
In this passage Foucault hints at why we need to supplement the critique of ideology and, along with it, the
democratic legitimation of law, with an ethics of virtue based upon “technologies of the self.” Ideology critique and
democracy are no more immune from the effects of power and domination than any other regime of “knowledge” and
“legitimation.” The “power- knowledge ” exerted by “expert” critics - be they psychoanalysts or critical social
theorists - and the “power-politics” exerted by democratic majorities must in turn be resisted by the counter-power
exercised of virtuous subjects. Taken in their own right, none of these forms of power are bad. Indeed, all of them can
be put to good use. But all of them need to check one another in a balanced play of forces.
Just how far this language of strategic gaming can be reconciled with the language of constraint-free mutual
understanding promoted by Habermas will become apparent shortly. Of course, such a reconciliation would have
seemed preposterous to Foucault and Habermas. But then again, since neither really understood the other, why should
we take their opinions as Gospel truth? To take one glaring example, Foucault’s imputation that Habermas is
advocating a utopian view of constraint-free communication simply contradicts what Habermas himself repeatedly
said on the subject. Habermas denied that “perfectly transparent communication” was possible, since we are at most
capable of reflecting on only a portion of our preconscious, taken-for-granted assumptions at any given time. And he
denied that the kind of power-free “ideal speech situation” presumed by speakers engaged in rational argumentation
was – or even should be – realizable. Indeed, this “counterfactual assumption” is only weakly regulative: it does not
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enjoin the realization of “ideal speech” - as Habermas never ceases to point out, there are many economic and
administrative contexts in which engaging in communicative interaction is either inefficient or inappropriate - but at
best warrants the questioning of any factual consensus as ideological.
So Habermas and Foucault both agree that there is no such thing as communication unconditioned by the effects
of power and that certain forms of power can be productive, positive, enabling, and empowering. That said, there
remains an important point of contention between Foucault and Habermas: Habermas continues to emphasize the
value of “truth” or “right” as a hedge against power, whereas Foucault doesn’t. Like Nietzsche, Foucault is deeply
skeptical of all knowledge claims. Because knowledge claims are conditioned by historical frames of understanding
that have been partly constituted and affected by subliminal “power relations,” Foucault wonders what it could
possibly mean to “justify” (legitimate) a claim as true or valid. In short, in Foucault’s account, all validity claims (as
Habermas puts it) are necessarily partial, constrained, and illegitimate - even if only somewhat. Hence, for him,
critique must take the negative form of “de-legitimizing” claims: “all knowledge rests on injustice (there is no right,
even in the act of knowing, no truth or foundation for truth)” (LCP, 163).
I will return to this provocative thesis at the conclusion of my essay, for it suggests why Foucault is more
attracted to a virtue ethics of personal, existential resistance than he is to deontological ethic based upon impersonal
rights. Before doing so, however, I would first like to return to a problem I mentioned above regarding the apparent
tension between Foucault’s description of social interaction as pre-eminently “strategic” and Habermas’s description
of the same as pre-eminently “consensual.” This little detour will help us understand the extent to which power might
be productive of “truth” and “right.” Understanding this will in turn shed light on the way in which Foucault regards
“power” as a kind of quasi-transcendental locus of productivity, a position Habermas criticizes - wrongly I believe - as
metaphysical.

Power and Action

In the passage cited above, Foucault asserts that he is following Habermas in claiming that power
(domination) is a "transcendental" on a par with communicative relationships and instrumental capacities. However,
in only one of the possible texts to which Foucault might have been referring does Habermas even remotely suggest
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that power is a transcendental medium of knowledge and action. The issue is further complicated by the fact that
Habermas often has in mind many different notions of power. In the text cited by Foucault, Kn o wled ge an d
Hu man In terests (1968 ), Hab er mas suggests that do minatio n (Herrscha ft) is no t a tr anscendental,
or necessar y feature o f the human co nditio n, like the other two or ientatio ns, b ut a co ntingent
featur e associated mainly with class so cieties. In a somewhat later essay, Habermas closely follows Hannah
Arendt in opposing power (Macht), conceived as united action based upon voluntary, communication-based consent,
to domination, or violence aimed at asymmetrical instrumental control.xxi In yet another venue - the Theory of
Communicative Action (1981) - Habermas discusses other senses of power associated with what he calls strategic
“speech acts” and “power-backed” systemic imperatives. Only here could it be said that Habermas accepts the
“necessity” of power in structuring human relationships.
In truth, both Foucault and Habermas regard power as a permanent, if variable, feature of society. For
Habermas, the manifestations of power, ranging from relatively innocuous forms of subtle influence to overt forms of
violent domination, vary both structurally and historically. From a structural point of view, power may designate a
feature of speech action or a mechanism of system integration. As a feature of a speech, it specifies the peculiar
sanction of authority backing up commands. Although in the Th eo ry o f Co mmun ica tive Action Habermas
categorically distinguished commands backed by mere threat of force from commands backed by rationally binding
moral authority, in a more recent reply to critics he conceded that "a continuum obtains between power that is merely
a matter of factual custom and power transformed into normative authority."xxii Such a continuum is attested to by the
simple fact that ra tiona lly bind ing moral platitudes such “Tell the truth!” are initially learned as commands backed
by threat of sanctions.xxiii
A similar continuity obtains when power is viewed as a vertical mechanism of systemic
integration..

xxiv

Even prior to the splitting off of autonomous economic and political subsystems, the exercise of

power in stratified tribal societies, Habermas notes, occurs in the form of p ersona l prestige and influence.
Importantly, this kind of power need not rely on sanctions. The asymmetrical exercise of power owing to differences
in lineage, gender, and generation is still interwoven in consensus-oriented communication between persons who,
morally speaking, remain mutually accountable to one another. Today, this same burden falls on technical experts,
despite their monopoly on the power of expertise. By contrast, the bureaucratic power exercised in modern
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organizations depends on impersonal legal sanction. Here the exercise of power is largely relieved of the above
burden. I say “largely” because, for Habermas, the exercise of administrative power still requires democratic
legitimation, which occurs within the medium of consensus-oriented communication. Although the government relies
upon legal coercion - not negotiation - in exacting compliance, this strategic medium remains subject to judicial and
public oversight (Reply, 254-58).
In a manner that invites comparison with Habermas’s taxonomy, some of Foucault’s late interviews also
distinguish between levels, or degrees, of power, domination, and governance. xxv Whereas domination involves
unilaterally exercising uncontested power over others, governance - even between unequals - involves some reciprocal
give and take.xxvi S t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s l i k e t h i s c a n e v e n b e p e r f e c t l y r e c i p r o c a l . I n d e e d ,
the most striking thing about Foucault’s discussion of strategically exercised power is
that he does not oppose such power to consensus-oriented communication.
Habermas’s tendency to do just the opposite partly reflects his some what
idiosyncratic understanding of strategic action. As Habermas understands it, strategic
action occurs whenever one or more actors pursue personal aims by influencing the
behavior of others through threat of force, covert manipulation, or some other
instrumental inducement. Often this requires concealing a strategic motive behind an
apparently open and consensual one (TCA I. 10, 85, 273-4). But this is not the only notion
of strategic action Habermas has in mind, as is evidenced by his discussion of rhetoric
a n d i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n xxvii. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , i t i s n o t t h e n o t i o n t h a t F o u c a u l t h a s
in mind, either.

Indeed, the egoism and atomism that Habermas, like many game

theorists, attributes to strategic action are much less pronounced in Foucault’s account
of strategic relations, since he repudiates methodological individualism. On the
contrary, if his notion of strategic action comports with any model of gamesmanship, it
would be the model of “play” that Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued underlies all forms
o f c o n s e n s u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . xxviii
Foucault tells us that a strategic power relation is "not simply a relationship
betwe en partner s, individ ual or collective; it is a wa y in which ce rtain actio ns modify
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o t h e r s " ( S P , 219). This comports with Gadamer’s concept of free play, in which it is the preconscious subtext of
the speaker’s utterance (including the perlocutionary, affective, and rhetorical force of speech) that draws out and
elicits a response from the listener. To this extent, subjective agency remains beholden to actions that have a meaning
(power and efficacy) all their own, independent of consciously intended aims. This is not a relationship of violence,
but requires "that 'the other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the
very end as a person who acts" (SP, 220). This is to say that "power is less a confrontation between two adversaries
or the linking of one to the other than a question of government": the structuration of a field of possible responses
(SP, 221). According to this latter reading, not only are freedom and power not mutually exclusive, but "freedom
may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power" (SP, 220). Hence the free play of actions and effects is
not entirely independent of rational agency - it presupposes a real and, as we shall see, legal capacity for initiative and
counter-initiative - but it is not reducible to it, as Habermas would like to think it is.
Speech act theory provides ample confirmation of this interplay of freedom and power. Take the example of
promising. As Habermas notes, the freedom of the addressee depends on his or her capacity to refuse the promise.
This offer thus presents an opportunity for exercising freedom; that is, it opens up a field of possible responses on the
part of the addressee. We might say that, by taking the initiative in opening up a determinate field of possibilities, the
speaker's offer constitutes a deployment of power whereby the response of the addressee is conducted. This
conducting, however, is not a manipulating. At best, only a field of possibilities - one that is relatively open - is
offered up by the speaker. This offer both limits and enables a range of responses, one of which is refusal and
resistance. The freedom and power of the addressee is conditional for the freedom and power of the speaker and vice
versa. Promise-making, for instance, would be meaningless if the addressee had no choice but to accept the offer.
The free consent of both speaker and addressee is at play here since, as Kant himself famously showed, without the
assumption of reciprocity that accompanies promise-making, the manipulation of the promise-breaker would never
succeed.
These remarks are important not only because they suggest that strategic reciprocity is prior to strategic
manipulation, but also because they imply that strategic actors - far from being passive bearers of functional roles and
internalized norms - actively and freely contribute to structuring the field of possible responses. Strategic power and
consensual freedom thus constitute one another, and both are necessary features of social relationships.
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Critical Practices: The ambivalence of Enlightenment

What implications does Foucault’s belief in the transcendental necessity of power have for critical practice? In
his late commentary on Kant’s famous essay of the same title, “What Is Enlightenment?” (1784), Foucault contrasts
two types of critical practice, both of which he finds implicit within Kant’s philosophy:

Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was
that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the
critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal,
necessary, obligatory, what is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of
arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of
necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. . . This
entails the obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for
formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that
have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing,
thinking, saying. In that sense criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a
metaphysics possible. . . it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of
all possible moral action, but it will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we
think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense
that it will not deduce from the form of what we are to what it is impossible for us to do and to
know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of
no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are. . . . It is seeking to give new impetus, as far and
wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom (FR:46).

Let us be very clear about what Foucault is saying here. He is not denying the existence of general conditions that
both constrain and make possible the peculiar mode of being we commonly associate with modern humanity - that
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much we have already established. The "universalizing tendencies" he discovers at the root of Western civilization "the acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom" - have constituted, in his opinion, "permanent elements"
(FR:48). That is why he characterizes "our" freedom has an "ascetic task" of self-production that is both discipline
and limit. As he puts it, "modernity does not 'liberate man in his own being'; it compels him to face the task of
producing himself" (FR:42--my emphasis).
Yet it is precisely this compulsion to be modern that in Foucault's judgment renders any justification of
modernity itself problematic. Although one might hypothesize about the conditions that define and limit the modern
compulsion to be free, one could not claim any transcendental certainty for them. In any case, if the enlightenment is
part of the "historical ontology of ourselves" that has determined who we are, it would make no sense to be for or
against it (FR:43). Because it is meaningless to legitimate what is beyond choice, and because there is no
emancipating knowledge that is not itself inherently partial and conditioned by preconscious effects of power, one
must remain content to do the one thing that is existentially possible, namely, freely reinterpret and live it in a manner
that best accords with one's singular understanding of who one is.
If Foucault eschews the role of Kantian legislator in favor of playing transgressive critic, it is only because
he no less than Habermas posits freedom - the compulsion to be free - as a kind of irresistible “limit” on our
transgressive practice. Or perhaps we should say “enabling condition.” For, in truth, are not Habermas and Foucault
describing social structures that, in some sense, both enable and empower us to resist and question power? Likewise,
once we accept the notion that all knowledge is itself inherently fallible, might we not say that we “know” - at least in
some provisional sense that encourages endless disputation and justification - that we are compelled and enabled to
be free? And isn’t this all that Habermas means by legitimation?
But - you say - Foucault is not Habermas. He has given up the notion that critical resistance must be
justified. If genealogical critics are called upon to justify their “claims,” they will not do so by offering reasons that
will be compelling to everyone. Using widely accepted scientific and historical practices need not entail acceptance
of their deeper truth or impartiality. xxix
Habermas finds this insouciant disregard for knowledge-based justification highly paradoxical. How can
Foucault expect others to take his claims seriously if they are not backed up with justifications supporting their truth
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and rightness, however contingent and fallible such arguments might be? Anyway, isn’t Foucault contradicting
himself when he claims to know that there is no knowledge? xxx
One way to extricate Foucault from this dilemma is to take seriously his suggestion that critical practice can
take non-discursive forms. In the last course he conducted at the College de France in 1984, Foucault talked about a
different kind of self-justification modeled on the parrhesia practiced by ancient Greek and Roman ethicists.xxxi The
emphasis here is on producing a "true life" through one's bearing and demeanor. In Habermas's scheme, such a notion
of truth-telling is still implicitly discursive insofar as it tacitly raises esthetic-expressive claims to truthfulness
(Wahrhaftigkeit) and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). But even if this were true, the peculiar justification of such
claims would not be anything like the justification of truth or validity claims. For in this case, Habermas
concedes, justification resides almost entirely in conducting oneself consistently and resolutely.
Now, Foucault's interest in parrhesia centers on its exemplifying a non-discursive form of justification in
precisely this sense. In other words, we might take this to mean that, for Foucault, critique really is nothing more than
the embodied exemplification of virtuous resistance, “performed” as Judith Butler says, but not rationally justified.xxxii
But it would be hard to square this assessment with his assertion that consensus remains "a critical idea to maintain at
all times." Indeed, far from dispensing with discursive reason as a critical tool, Foucault, as we saw, actually affirms
the mutual and unavoidable interaction between communicative, strategic, and expressive types of action. According
to him, one must "ask oneself what proportion of nonconsensuality is implied in such a power relationship, and
whether the degree of nonconsensuality is necessary or not" so that "one may question every power relationship to that
extent" (FR, 379).
Parrhesia, must itself be reconfigured as a social virtue that also impinges on issues of social justice in which
the rights of others are at stake. As such it must combine two distinct critical techniques: one that is aesthetic and
transgressive and another that is moral and discursive. Transgressive critique resists normative limits. It invents new
vocabularies for describing who we are and who we want to be as individuals - all new ways of expressing and caring
for ourselves. Finally, it elevates to a fine art the "undefined work of freedom that is condemned to creating its
self-awareness and its norms out of itself" (TAHP, 106). Hence it principally acts upon "bodies and pleasures" rather
than upon minds and reasons.xxxiii Ideology critique, by contrast, embraces normative limits. Ideals of truth and
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justice inspire us to seek our own empowerment in concert with others. They compel us to reason together as free and
equal participants in a democratic form of life.
Democratic accountability designates an on-going process of questioning, resisting and dissenting. On this
point Foucault and Habermas are in perfect agreement. As the passage I cited earlier clearly shows, Foucault no less
than Habermas appeals to unconstrained dialogue as a standard of critique. Is this not to say that he too accepts the
practice of legitimation?
The burdens of legitimation fall upon persons who are committed to reserving as much freedom for others
as they reserve for themselves. This kind of freedom would scarcely be imaginable outside of a constitutional
framework that protects against the intrusive and constraining power of those anonymous systems of surveillance
and discipline that find their maximum concentration in the state. By the same token, it can be argued that the
framework itself is in jeopardy when people cease to question its meaning. Each must interpret this framework as a
realization of both their common humanity and their unique individuality. Humanity and individuality mediate one
another and both refer to needs and desires. Hence the integrity of a system of rights must depend on the extent to
which legal subjects have freely cultivated their own aesthetic sensibilities.xxxiv

Alienation, Aesthetics, and The Limits of Ideology Critique
Habermas is fond of saying that values interpret our needs; they relate our physiological and corporal being
to our spiritual yearning for complete happiness. Freedom and duty do not exhaust our ethos. Ruminating on the
limits of a form of social criticism oriented exclusively toward questions of justice and domination, he once asked:
Is it possible that one day an emancipated human race could encounter itself within an expanded
space of discursive formation of will and yet be robbed of the light in which it is capable of
interpreting its life as something good? The revenge of a culture exploited over millennia for the
legitimation of domination would then take this form: right at the moment of overcoming age-old
repressions it would harbor no violence, but it would have no content either.

Social justice - to paraphrase Habermas - is no substitute for social happiness. And here we need to recall that last
vestige of eudaimonistic Marxism in Habermas’s theory of communicative action. According to Habermas,
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capitalism necessitates unhappiness. It promotes a selective rationalization in which “one cultural value sphere” - in
this case, the moral-ethical-aesthetic sphere - “is insufficiently institutionalized without a structure-building effect
for the whole of society and (at least) one sphere of life” - the economic-administrative sphere - “prevails so far that
it subordinates other orders of life under its alien form of rationality” (TCA I, 240). Simply put, capitalism alienates
us from our lifeworld, in which individual needs are interpreted by shared values that in turn aspire towards a
felicitous state of harmony. Capitalism has thus “found some functional equivalent or ideology formation,” which
consists in frustrating this harmonization by “preventing holistic interpretations from coming into existence” (TCA
II, 383).
Now, there is no other guidepost for determining when our lives have become overly colonized by economy
and state, overly splinted and fragmented by the hyper-specialization of expertise, and overly alienated from the
lifeworld except by appeal to value judgments that express our felt sensibility that things are not well with us. To cite
Habermas: “if we do not wish to relinquish altogether standards by which a form of life might be judged to be more
or less failed, deformed, unhappy, or alienated, we can look to the model of sickness and health” (TCA I, 73-74). But
he immediately adds that the “balance among non-self-sufficient moments, [the] equilibrated interplay of the
cognitive with the moral and aesthetic-practical” implied in this model cannot be derived from “the formal concept of
freedom which modernity’s decentered understanding of the world has left us.” Unlike justice and emancipation,
happiness is not directly implicated in the formal structures of the “ideal speech situation.” As such, it is questionable
whether critical theory ought to speculate about it. Indeed, Habermas goes so far as to suggest that the critique of
alienation is something that critical theory “must refrain” from doing (TCA II, 383).
Of course, Habermas cannot be serious about this. He cannot abandon the critique of alienation - of the
“colonization of the lifeworld” and of the “splitting of of expert cultures” - without playing into the hands of a system
that encourages uncritical thinking by “preventing holistic experiences from coming into existence.” So despite
being rationally ungrounded, the critique of alienation remains both desirable and possible from Habermas’s
perspective. Indeed, holistic orientations to collective well-being, happiness, and the good are indispensable for
other reasons as well. According to Habermas, they provide the necessary complement to his deontological specifically procedural - account of law and democracy. The rights that instantiate procedural ideals of freedom,
equality, and justice are themselves only realized in the form of enforceable statutes. But the process by which
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legislatures, administrators, and judges define rights in turn responds to specific harms and benefits - and broader
“ethical” conceptions of public well-being - debated by average citizens.
As I noted above, debates about harms and benefits are only possible to the extent that individuals cultivate
their aesthetic-ethical sensibilities. Part of this cultivation no doubt occurs in rational argumentation about judgments
of taste. However, it cannot be reduced to it.xxxv For prior to being discussed, judgments of taste must be cultivated in
aesthetic experience, which is partly intuitive and affective. Habermas adds that, “such an experience is used to
illuminate a life-historical situation and is related to life problems, it . . . not only renews the interpretation of our needs
in whose light we perceive the world,” but it also “permeates as well our cognitive significations and our normative
expectations and changes the manner in which all these moments refer to one another. In this respect, modern art
harbors a utopia that becomes a reality to the degree that the mimetic powers sublimated in a work of art find
resonance in the mimetic relations of a balanced and undistorted intersubjectivity of everyday life” (MP, 353).
Talk of art’s “mimetic powers” finding “resonance” in everyday life once again brings us back to Foucault’s
aesthetic technologies of self-formation. Contrary to what one might expect from the utopian yearnings embedded in
art, one cannot experience reconciliation alone. It requires an intimate caring for one’s self and one’s consociates in all
their sensuous singularity. xxxvi Despite their self-referential nature, technologies of aesthetic self-formation are
instruments for communicating care. So, in addition to our metaphysical faith in and humanitarian hope for a better
life for all, the individualized care and responsibility we extend to particulars others requires a unique receptivity to
our own "bodies and pleasures." We learn to care about ourselves from others caring about us and also from our caring
about them.xxxvii
To conclude, the seemingly solitary judgement and phronesis exercised by the transgressive virtue ethicist
may well complement the collective process of normative legitimation exercised by critics of ideology. Yet the
difference between the former and the latter still stands - no matter how far one “enlarges” one’s felt sensibilities to
include others. As Nietzsche wisely observed, it is “selfish to experience one’s own judgment as a universal
law.”xxxviii(GS, 265).
And yet, in the process of interpreting that law for purposes of social criticism, how can we possibly avoid
doing what Nietzsche bids us not to do? As a standard for criticizing injustice, humanity is but an empty receptacle
that must be filled with our most deeply felt utopian yearnings for happiness. What we know of it is largely what we
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have made of it. In the age of humanism, that sounds a bit terrifying. We have become the God that we ourselves killed
– so much so that there is literally nothing left in our own humanity that could withstand the infinite depths of our
critical reflection. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s lament that he is “all too human” also expresses a joyful paean to the
“overman” within him whose every affirmation of life is simultaneously an act of Promethean self-nihilation,.
Likewise for Foucault, this sublime transgression of limits contains an element of the tragic. Perhaps it is this Faustian
dialectic – so emblematic of the horrors of the last century - that Nietzsche had in mind when he said that we must
“discover the hero no less than the fool in our passion for knowledge” (GS, 164). If so, then the tragic “hero” in our
passion for self-knowledge must be the one who learns to embrace the most enduring and noblest of lies, namely, the
illusion that there is a humanity and truth worth striving for. And here I cite Nietzsche one last time:

(T)he question "Why science?" leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality at all when life, nature,
and history are "not moral"? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is
presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and
insofar as they affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this
world, our world? But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith
upon which our faith in science rests - that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless
anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that
Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. But what if this
should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error,
blindness, the lie - if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie? (GS, 282-3).
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argument against strong holism, see J. Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1991), 115ff.
xxx

.Hoy suggests that Foucault's post-modernism enables him to avoid the charge of pragmatic contradiction (or
self-referential paradox) leveled against him by Habermas. As a post-modernist Foucault can both accept the
inescapability of rational notions of truth and legitimacy - something the anti-modernist can't do - and deny that they
can (or need) be given any transcendental or teleological justification. Habermas seems to miss this aspect of
Foucault's position, classifying him as an "anti-modernist" and "young conservative" (one who yearns for the
"archaic, the spontaneous powers of imagination, of experience and emotionality") who nonetheless departs from a
modern concept of emancipated subjectivity. See David Hoy, "Foucault: Modern 0r Postmodern?" in After Foucault,
12 -4 1.
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. See T. Flynn, “Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at the College de France (1984),” in Bernauer and
Rasmussen, The Final Foucault, 102-18.
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. J. Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay On Foucault’s Virtue,” in The Political, 212-226.

xxxiii

. Habermas compares Foucault's appeal to a different economy of bodies and pleasures to Georges Bataille's
appeal to the heterogeneous and Peter Sloterdijk's to the Cynics' bodily-expressive forms of protest, both of which are
similar to the parrhesiast’s truth-telling. The comparison with Bataille seems weak. Bataille’s appeal to
“sovereignty” actually resonates with Marcuse's critique of repressive desublimation, in that both envisage an
estheticization of the body and pleasure free of the constraints of genital sexuality. But as Habermas elsewhere
acknowledges, Foucault himself never tired of rejecting the notion that there existed a "primordial vitality" (or
"purity of desire") beneath sexual prohibitions. See B.-H. Levy, "Power and Sex: An Interview with Michel
Foucault," Telos 32 (1977):158; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1964), 56-83; and P. Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, 2 vols. (Frankfurt,
1982). For a critique 0f Foucault's appeal to "a posthumanist political rhetoric of body language" see Nancy Fraser,
"Foucault's Body Language: A Posthumanist Political Rhetoric?" in Unruly Practices, 55-66.
xxxiv

. Cf. TCA II, 40ff and 57ff., where Habermas appeals to Mead's account of the relationship between "me" and "I"
to explain the complementarity of moral individuation and autonomy, 0n the one hand, and esthetic selfrealization
and creativity, on the other.
xxxv

. Foucault's defenders seem to have misunderstood the thrust of Habermas's discourse ethic and its appeal to
unconstrained consensus. Dreyfus and Rabinow, for example, argue that Habermas's advocacy of enlightenment
requires replacing phronesis, rhetoric, and art with rational communication that has been purged of all strategic
power relations - a position that is clearly contrary to his position as I have laid it out here. On a somewhat different
point, it seems too facile to say, as Habermas and McCarthy do, that Foucault ended up embracing the aesthetic side
of the enlightenment in opposition to the cognitive and moral sides. See McCarthy (1990):463; Dreyfus and
Rabinow, "What Is Maturity? Habermas and Foucault on 'What Is Enlightenment?' " in Hoy, 119-21; J. Habermas,
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990 - hereafter MC), 98,133, 175, 195ff; and my "Completing the Project of
Enlightenment: Habermas on Aesthetic Rationality," New German Critique 53 (Spring/Summer 1991):67-103; and
Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (Yale University Press, 1987), 39, 101, 131, 172.
xxxvi

. Cf. Habermas's response to Kohlberg and Gilligan in "Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning
Stage," The Philosophical Forum, vol. XXI, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1989-90), p. 47.
xxxvii

. Cf. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982). Does a virtue ethic of care and a deontological ethic of justice designate opposed
methods of moral deliberation? Or do they designate complementary aspects of a more inclusive and complete
account of moral deliberation? I incline toward this latter alternative, and I think Habermas does too. Habermas
proposes a two-step process of moral deliberation involving the justification of norms followed by their contextual
application. Both steps involve real or simulated dialogue incorporating the perspectives of generalized and concrete
other. This position seems to resonate with Gilligan's own views. For, although she distinguishes between social
concern and intimate caring (p. 155), she shares Habermas's opinion that communicative openness is basic to both (pp.
29-30). In this context see Seyla Benhabib, "The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics," in Critical Theory:
The Essential Readings; Habermas's response to Gilligan in MC:175-82, and my discussion of Gilligan, Benhabib,
and Habermas in Critical Theory and Philosophy, pp. 207-11.
xxxviii

. F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 64; hereafter GS.

39

